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It is ironic that the pursuit of objectivity is among the most critical yet unresolved 
problems confronting the study of higher education. The problem is particularly 
evident in the history of higher education where many historians in a time-
honoured tradition continue to reason that their primary task is "simply to show 
how it really was". In the light of this commitment it is easy to assume that the. 
nature of objectivity has long been resolved with its pursuit at this time little more 
than a matter of idle curiosity. 
Objectivity, however, has been defined in many ways, with one observer 
indicating that it has been achieved when the explanation of an historical event is 
considered to be "superior" to any other which might be proposed (Gorman, 1981, 
p. 131). This observation shifts attention away from the difficulties associated 
with arriving at a precise definition of objectivity, and suggests that any claim to a 
better and, perhaps, a nonprejudicial interpretation of events entails a judgment 
about the criteria or standards whereby-objectivity is to be assessed (see, for 
example, Carr, 1961; Cebik, 1978; and Gagnon, 1982). 
In the study of such criteria the work of T.S. Kuhn is of special interest. His 
understanding of the problem brings into focus broader methodological concerns 
which relate to the structure of knowledge and the hypotheses that guide its 
development. Although historians and others in the field of higher education may 
be cognizant of Kuhn's approach to the problem of objectivity as argued in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970b), few have taken notice of "Objectivity, 
Value Judgment and Theory Choice" (1977c) and "The Relations Between the 
History and the Philosophy of Science" (1977d), two of his subsequent essays that 
suggest further possibilities for an investigation of objectivity in the study of the 
past.1 In explaining the history of the university, it might be argued that Kuhn's 
analysis has relevance where concepts2 have been identified with the preservation 
of tradition (Harris, 1976), the revival of classical learning (Rashdall, 1936), and 
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the renewal of town life (Russell, 1978). Given these and other conditions which 
led to the emergence of the university, how does the student of higher education 
decide which concepts are appropriate to an accurate and, in the light of evaluative 
criteria, an objective reconstruction of the past?3 
OBJECTIVITY IN RESEARCH 
From the standpoint of Kuhn's analysis the idea of objectivity in the study of 
higher education must be examined in relation to a conceptual framework or 
paradigm that consciously or otherwise provides a context for the explanation of 
events.4 The pursuit of objectivity in history is concerned not only with the facts, 
but their interconnection within a framework that is "global" in nature (1977d, p. 
15) and inseparable from the hypotheses which enter into the explanation of 
events. At another level, and perhaps more importantly, it brings into focus the 
criteria employed in determining the extent to which objectivity has been attained. 
Among the many criteria which may be invoked to assess whether objectivity 
has been achieved are those of accuracy and consistency (Kuhn, 1977c, p. 338). 
Although applied primarily to studies in the natural sciences, these standards of 
evaluation are also apparent in the social sciences and history, having, therefore, a 
direct bearing on the study of higher education. As a criterion accuracy is indicated 
when data and concepts are in agreement with the results of existing observation, 
or if applied to history with events established by means of historical records and 
artifacts. Consistency, the second criterion, is evident when the components of a 
paradigm, including the concepts which it contains, are employed in a uniform 
way both within the framework itself and in relation to "other currently accepted 
theories". In extending this notion to history, the use of concepts is considered to 
be consistent when their meanings remain unchanged in the context of a given 
historical perspective (Hodysh, 1984). 
Of course it is not possible in a brief paper to examine the many ways that 
criteria of objectivity may be applied to the study of higher education. The task, 
however, can be made instructive by limiting the investigation to a method of 
explanation identified as colligation. In a generic sense colligation indicates a 
"binding together" of isolated data usually for the purpose of generalization. This 
meaning is essentially retained for historical research where the term is defined as 
the process of explaining an event by simply tracing its connection to other events, 
thereby locating it in historical context (Walsh, 1960, p. 59). The method, though 
not restricted to the study of history, relies in part on the use of concepts as a means 
of organizing and "binding together" historical data. It is frequently found in the 
company of other interpretive techniques and has come to be associated with 
explaining the more collective aspects of historical development (Walsh, 1974, p. 
135). 
This form of explanation leads to an understanding of historical developments 
that taken as a whole is greater than that which might be achieved by their study in 
isolation. On the one hand, it applies to the collection of events represented by 
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inquiry into periods of history. In this context events are made understandable by 
their grouping or classifying under "dominant concepts or leading ideas". Linked 
to other forms of explanation, it enables the historian to establish the order and 
connection of events (Walsh, 1959, p. 297). To illustrate reference can be made to 
the idea of the "quiet revolution" in the Province of Quebec. The "quiet 
revolution" is often identified as a period of change from an elitist, clerically 
influenced society steeped in tradition and detached from the economic life of the 
continent, to an egalitarian view of society with an adherence to a secular political 
ethic, and a concern with the technology and economics of a post-industrial state 
(Henchey, 1972, p. 95). The concept, frequently employed in reference to the 
history of higher education, identifies a cluster of events that occurred largely in 
the decade of the 1960's, the antecedents of which might be traced to the 1950's 
and even earlier (see, for example, Audet, 1971, p. 383; Le Blanc, 1972, p. 175; 
Magnuson, 1984, p. 1; and Martin, 1966, p. 63). 
In this context the concept of revolution allows the historian to identify 
particular events associated with the growth of the experimental and social 
sciences which in part characterized the "powerful hidden forces" of social and 
economic change in Quebec (Martin, 1966, p. 64). Citing documentary evidence 
and other data, the historian may refer to both individuals and groups which 
consciously and at times, perhaps, unknowingly contributed to the idea of the 
concept. Although one may find historical events which challenged this 
development, they do not necessarily diminish the value of the "quiet revolution" 
as characteristic of the period. Any evidence which a researcher might bring 
forward to negate the efficacy of the concept would have to be "prominent" or 
"significant" (Walsh, 1974). 
On the other hand, colligation may be used to explain a series of happenings 
related to a policy or a process showing how events resulted in a particular outcome 
(Thompson, 1967, p. 92). An example might be found in Harris' consideration of 
the "joint action" of scholars and administrators at the founding Conference of 
Canadian Universities (1976). In examining this development, Harris draws 
attention to the cooperative effort of universities in addressing a series of problems 
ranging from internal affairs, such as the standards of degrees and the transfer of 
students, to issues of an external nature represented by government assistance and 
financial aid (pp. 207-210). This "joint action" of universities might be identified 
as "part of a general movement" explaining social and policy developments 
(Walsh, 1974, p. 135). 
Most importantly, and irrespective of the particular form which it takes, such 
explanation requires the historian to exercise a kind of "surface rationality" in the 
interconnection of events. Put differently, events in a given setting are linked by 
means of the historian's effort to rationally establish a connection of historical 
evidence. Bissell's observations on the "reorganization of the structure" of the 
Faculty of Music at the University of Toronto is an example that might be viewed 
as part of a larger plan of explaining the function of the fine arts program (1974, 
pp. 95-96). This does not imply, however, that all individuals associated with 
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Bissell's structural reorganization were at that time cognizant of the plan, but 
rather that general ideas of restructuring could influence the conduct of individuals 
even when at any particular moment they may not have been aware of such ideas 
(Walsh, 1960, p. 61). It allows the historian to admit events that might not only 
appear to counter or work against the general developments of the period, but those 
which might be termed unexpected or even "irrational". 
Within this framework, then, the use of concepts in the rational linkage of data is 
inseparable from the hypotheses that not only postulate the theory at the historian's 
disposal (Shafer, 1974, p. 165), but that more specifically guide and organize the 
course of investigation (Carr, 1961, p. 117; Kuhn, 1977a, p. xxi, and 1977b, p. 
270; and compare with Dray, 1981, p. 159). As such, the components of the 
researcher's intellectual framework, including the concepts, are theory-laden. 
Their meanings are a product of the intellectual milieu from which they emerged. 
It might be said that each generation must rewrite the past from its own 
perspective. 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
These principles of research have a universal application that is not restricted in 
historical time and place. Their extension beyond the Canadian example to the 
Renaissance of the Twelfth Century provides a context for the analysis of 
objectivity in one of the most celebrated periods in the history of higher education. 
In this setting the works of Haskins (1927a, 1927b, 1929 and 1957), Leff (1968) 
and Cobban (1975) serve as the basis for consideration. 
The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century was identified by Haskins who, in 
examining the intellectual and cultural events of the period, applied the term not 
only to the twelfth century proper, but to the years which preceded and followed 
(1927b, p. 10). The renaissance as a concept in research has been open to a wide 
range of interpretation, the precise meaning of which can be traced to formula-
tions established in the nineteenth century (see, for example, Cassirer, 1943; 
Ferguson, 1963; Ladner, 1982; and Stalnaker, 1967). 
Under the influence of Burckhardt and others, Haskins applied the concept of 
renaissance as "a revival of ancient learning and also of ancient art". The period 
signalled "an age of new life and new knowledge" (Haskins, 1927b, p. 190), 
beginning with the growth of the cathedral schools and closing with the founding 
of the earliest universities. In the development of curriculum, it started with only 
the basic outlines of the seven liberal arts and ended with new works in philosophy, 
law, medicine and science (Haskins, 1927b, p. 6). Above all it was a period 
characterized by an intellectual revival. 
Haskins' usage of the concept, however, is somewhat novel in that he places the 
phenomenon in what traditionally is identified as the Middle Ages, a period which 
for some in the development of higher education has been seen as uniform, static 
and unprogressive (1927b, p. 3). He challenges this view and by contrast questions 
the unique and decisive characteristics so often attributed to the "great" or Italian 
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Renaissance, claiming that the difference in culture between the twelfth and 
fourteenth centuries "was not nearly so sharp as it seemed to the humanists and 
their modern followers" (1927b, p. 6). The twelfth century was typified by a 
"requickened intellectual life" that grew into the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. It embraced, for Haskins, a variety of "leading ideas" that extended the 
accepted understanding of the renaissance to an earlier period of time, implying in 
the process a continuity of curriculum development (Ferguson, 1963, p. 25). 
Whether the twelfth-century renaissance is looked upon as a revival of learning 
in its own right or as an extension of either the Middle Ages or the Italian 
Renaissance, it is apparent that the colligatory concept is more than the sum of its 
individual parts. For Haskins the concept of renaissance is placed in the context of 
an intellectual framework that includes not only the introduction of new historical 
data, but an hypothesis about the spread and proliferation of knowledge affecting 
the emergence of the university. 
Additional insight into the relationship of concepts and hypotheses centres on 
Leff's colligation of events surrounding the ecclesiastical censure of Aristotelian 
works in the curriculum of the faculty of arts at Paris in 1210 (1968, p. 193). In 
explaining the importance of this event, Leff hypothesizes the antinomy between 
Aristotelian thought and Christian theology. In so doing, he examines the 
difference in outlook between the faculties of arts and theology, noting the 
increasing influence of philosophy in the intellectual life of the university. It was 
not only the writing of Aristotle that challenged the "conservative" theology 
reflected in the curriculum, but the Aristotelian influence evident in the work of 
such medieval scholars as Amoury of Bene and David of Dinant (p. 193). The 
conflict, though situated in the University of Paris, had wider implications that 
reflected an ongoing dispute between the use of the concepts of "reason and 
revelation" and their effect on the control of curriculum throughout the medieval 
period. 
Focusing on the synod of Sens of 1210, Leff examines the interconnection of 
events leading up to and following the proscriptions against certain aspects of 
Aristotelian thought. His explanation of the event might be viewed as more than a 
concern with interfaculty rivalry. It represented a "rational" examination of policy 
and a joint action on behalf of theological masters to question and, if necessary, 
remove Aristotelian references that were seen to challenge established beliefs. 
Particular attention is given to restrictions against the use of philosophical texts 
and their exclusion from the program of studies. For Leff, the "debate between 
reason and revelation" functions as a hypothesis by which he makes intelligible not 
only the proscription of 1210 as an individual event but its relation to other events 
in their historical setting. 
A final illustration refers to Cobban (1975) who, directing his interest to social 
and economic data, provides an alternative perspective on the development of 
university curricula. He finds in this development a strong commitment to a 
"utilitarian" outlook on education which, from the standpoint of continuity, can be 
traced to ancient Greece and Rome (p. 6). Although there occurred in the early part 
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of the twelfth century a reassertion of humanism in education as a study of the style 
and substance of classical literature, and although this study had an impact on the 
universities, it is Cobban's contention that utilitarian pressures prevented literary 
humanism as such from becoming entrenched as the basis of higher education (p. 
8). This does not imply that higher education was devoid of a humanistic tradition, 
but that in curriculum its intellectual roots in logic and speculative thought 
responded to an "urban and economic revival" which had made an appearance by 
the thirteenth century (p. 20). 
For Cobban, the principle of utility "most adequately" represents the "medieval 
university-community nexus" and serves as a referent for much of the analysis 
from the founding of Salerno, Bologna, Paris and other institutions to the 
investigation of student power and the nature of the academic community. 
Universities are viewed primarily, though not exclusively, as vocational schools 
with a concern for exploring the possibilities of "the established social pattern" (p. 
165). Along with the colleges they were products of "impersonal economic and 
social forces of change" (p. 140) and were "born of the need to enlarge the scope of 
professional education in an increasingly urbanized society" (p. 22). 
The significance of professional study emerges in a number of instances 
including the University of Bologna where Cobban observes that administrative 
control rested largely in the hands of students. Noting the relationship of the 
"predominantly municipal and lay character" of education in northern Italy to the 
need for legal skills based on a curriculum emphasizing grammar and rhetoric 
(p. 48), he colligates events under the concept of "student power" in which control 
of the university was vested in the student community (p. 62). Reference is made 
to data pertaining to the regulation of professors in their delivery of lectures, and 
on the nature, organization and evaluation of curriculum, reflecting in southern 
Europe the "economic stranglehold" exercised by students. Cobban establishes the 
basis for his theory with an hypothesis that highlights the socioeconomic 
relationship of the university to society and, in response to the development of 
professional studies, the utilitarian bent of curriculum. 
HYPOTHESES AND OBJECTIVITY 
This analysis suggests that the process of concept formation is inseparable from the 
hypotheses that the historian of higher education brings to the selection and 
organization of data. The extent to which the process contributes to an objective 
determination of events brings into focus the criteria of accuracy and consistency 
by which objectivity is to be assessed. In considering whether a concept accurately 
reflects the actual state of affairs, attention must be given to historical data and the 
particular events which they represent. Such a concept serves to group particular 
events in the historical situation (Walsh, 1960, p. 59), showing in a rational way 
how they are interconnected within the researcher's intellectual framework or 
paradigm. The meaning of the concept in turn is dependent on the hypothesis 
which governs the general direction and organization of events. 
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Haskins, for example, derives the concept of the renaissance not from the actual 
period of the twelfth century but from the more recent work of Burckhardt who 
identifies the renaissance with classical and secular meanings. In following this 
approach, Haskins introduces an imported term to account for the data of an earlier 
historical time. It might be queried if the identification of secular and classical 
meanings with the renaissance adequately accounts for the available data. Put 
differently, and notwithstanding the excellence of his research, it could be argued 
that Haskins has excluded historical evidence pertaining to religious and 
theological developments in the study of higher education (Benson and Constable, 
1982, p. xxiii). 
In defense of Haskins, it is obvious that the selection of data is inevitable, 
recognizing that this can only be accomplished at the expense of full agreement 
with the actual events of the period. After all, the rational reconstruction of events 
must take into account those data which are considered to be "prominent" or 
"significant" (Walsh, 1974). Of course the hypothesis that the renaissance is a 
secular and classical revival bound to a particular period of historical development 
has in the final analysis much to do with the kind of data Haskins may introduce. It 
is evident that in fulfilling the criterion of accuracy, the historian is challenged 
with a task that extended to its fullest implications can best be described as 
monumental. 
Cobban also inserts an imported concept into the presentation of events not as a 
way to describe the period as a whole, but rather in terms of social processes within 
the period itself. Hypothesizing the importance of economic and social factors, he 
examines "the emergence of student power" as a route to an "economic 
stranglehold" on the curriculum. Colligation under this concept allows Cobban to 
introduce historical data pertaining to the university of Bologna. In what way does 
the emergence of student power as a contemporary concept, trailing present-day 
connotations, accurately reflect the actual social processes affecting curriculum in 
twelfth century Bologna? Moreover, what weight or importance should be 
assigned to the selection of evidence in determining what actually happened? After 
all, irrespective of the hypothesis which guides the interpretation of events, the 
historian must decide on the significance of data to be embraced by the concept, 
keeping in mind that the introduction of a contemporary concept to different 
spatio-temporal conditions allows for a perspective which may misinterpret, not 
only the facts the historian has elected to omit (Kuhn, 1977b), but by implication 
those which the historian has elected to include. 
Many of these concerns apply equally to the use of concepts indigenous to the 
historical period under investigation. Leff 's explanation of restrictions placed 
upon the study of Aristotelian works at Paris in 1210 is linked to an hypothesis of 
continuing tension between the proponents of reason and revelation. These 
dominant concepts, extending back in one form or another to the fifth century, and 
perhaps earlier, play a critical role in the dispute between masters in the faculties of 
arts and theology. How is the historian to decide what historical evidence should 
be brought forward to clarify the nature of continuing tension between reason and 
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revelation and their respective roles in explaining the proscription of Aristotelian 
thought in the university curriculum? Whether concerned with periods, group 
processes or individual events, such accuracy would seem to be dependent both on 
the preferences of the historian, who in fashioning historical explanation 
establishes a "demonstrated agreement" of concepts and data, and on the 
availability of evidence, including documents, diaries, letters and artifacts, 
pre-selected according to what the historical peoples and cultures themselves 
assumed were worth preserving. 
The problems are no less critical in attempting to determine the implications of 
consistency, the second criterion of objectivity. This criterion, which is evident 
when the meaning of a concept remains unchanged either in the context of a given 
intellectul framework or in relation to other concepts to which it is connected, is 
also associated with the criterion of accuracy (Kuhn, 1977b). Attention is directed 
to Haskins' use of the term renaissance which one critic observes is employed in 
different ways (Ladner, 1982, p. 1). At one point, Haskins identifies the term with 
a "revival" and at another with a "new birth", prompting questions about what he 
actually meant and, in reference to the criterion of accuracy, the events which the 
term portrays. It would seem that a university curriculum represented by a 
"revival" is different in its nature and purpose from one which has experienced a 
"new birth". By way of comparison, Ferguson associates the meaning of the 
renaissance with social and economic changes of the fourteenth century. Although 
both historians endeavour to apply the term consistently within the context of their 
conceptual frameworks, its extension beyond their respective boundaries would 
expose the concept to differences not only in the meaning, but in the data 
evidenced in its support. 
Now it may be argued that difficulties associated with determining the accuracy 
and consistency of concepts is resolved in part by the historian's attempt to 
rationally explain historical events in relation to the identification of a policy, 
whether this was consciously or unknowingly carried out by historical actors and 
social institutions. But to what extent does "student power" represent a conscious 
or unconscious manifestation of policy and what importance might Cobban assign 
to the evidence on behalf of one interpretation or the other? Once again the 
historian has imparted to the selection and classification of data a direction and 
surface rationality that is not necessarily inherent to the evidence itself. 
These examples address not only the influences that act upon the program of 
studies in higher education, but at a methodological level the hypotheses that enter 
into the process of explanation. Whether the hypothesis applies to the period of the 
Renaissance of the Twelfth Century as a whole, to a singular event in context such 
as the curricular restrictions of 1210, or to the social processes that affect the 
method and context of studies, it is part of the global relationship or paradigm 
which serves to organize the presentation of events. As in all research, an 
hypothesis is neither correct nor incorrect in its own right, but is merely a guide to 
the rational investigation of events (Hodysh, 1977). 
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IMPLICATIONS 
The observations on the works of Haskins, Cobban, and Leff in no way impugn the 
accuracy or consistency of their explanations. They simply illustrate the kinds of 
heuristic questions that in terms of objectivity may and, perhaps, should confront 
research into higher education, whether these are associated with explanation as it 
applies to the control and administration of university curricula, or to the 
justification of curriculum content in the light of particular or socially directed 
events. They suggest that the process of research, in whatever form it appears, is 
interdependent with the hypotheses that direct the course of investigation. If this is 
the case, then the criteria of accuracy and consistency as measures of objectivity 
can only be applied within a global relationship or framework wherein the 
explanation resides. It would seem, therefore, that the entire process of 
explanation is theory-laden and any attempt to determine a nonprejudicial and 
"superior" explanation of events is confronted with provocative questions about 
the possibility of objectivity in historical investigation. 
It would seem that the pursuit of objectivity is a legitimate, if not an essential 
affair of research in the field of higher education. Yet to clarify the nature of this 
quest is anything but an easy task. This does not imply that the pursuit should be 
abandoned, but rather that it might be seen in a different way. The standard criteria 
of accuracy and consistency, though useful measures of objectivity in a narrow 
sense, are meaningful only within a particular paradigm, their value prescribed by 
the concepts and hypotheses that govern the research. For the historian to "simply 
show how it really was" is, indeed, a lasting ideal, yet to ignore the difficulties 
which this purpose would seem to incur is no doubt unacceptable. If this is the 
case, then it may well be the meaning and not the limit of objectivity that is 
ultimately at stake (Kuhn, 1977c). Perhaps it is this dimension of objectivity that 
should focus the attention of researchers in the field of higher education. 
FOOTNOTES 
' In addition to The Structure (1970b) and the collection of new as well as previously published essays in 
The Essential Tension (1977a) , especially the "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research" 
(1977b) , Kuhn has developed his views in a number of related papers (1968, 1970a, and 1971). 
2See Kaplan (1964, p. 46) for a discussion of the concept "as a rule of judging or acting, a prescription 
for organizing the materials of exper ience . . . . " 
3This is not to imply that research into higher educat ion has ignored such theoretical concerns, but 
rather that its direction has often been general in nature and explored somewhat apart f rom an abundant 
and informative literature (see, fo r example , Blackburn and Conrad , 1984; and Thelin, 1982). 
Whether or not this might be attributed to a lack of communica t ion between practit ioners and theorists, 
it is evident that the benefi t of interaction remains to be achieved (see, for example , Johnson, 1983; 
a n d T y a c k , 1978). 
"This paper is not directly concerned with the process of theory change but limits investigation to 
problems in what Kuhn identifies as the "norma l" phase of theory development (1970b, p. 10). 
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